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dc.contributor.authorRenucci, Antoine
HAL ID: 19209
ORCID: 0000-0002-7967-5347
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-09T09:35:34Z
dc.date.available2009-07-09T09:35:34Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/1020
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectGouvernance d'entrepriseen
dc.subjectRationnement du créditen
dc.subjectCredit rationingen
dc.subjectAgency rentsen
dc.subjectUnitary-formen
dc.subjectForme fonctionnelleen
dc.subjectForme multidivisionnelleen
dc.subjectMulti-divisional formen
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.subject.classificationjelG3en
dc.titleAccess to financing, rents, and organization of the firmen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper provides a theory for the choice of an organizational structure by the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned about overload. The headquarters can avoid overload by delegating operational decisions to divisions, i.e., moving the firm to a multidivisional structure. We show that under moral hazard these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and that the multidivisional structure is able to invest more. Thus, there is a trade-off between increasing investment and paying rents. We also show that this trade-off applies to situations where firms consider engaging in acquisitions and joint ventures, or where entrepreneurs consider resorting to venture capitalists.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of corporate finance
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol14en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-09
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages337-346en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.001en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00365983/en/
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelOrganisation et finances d'entrepriseen


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