The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria
Viossat, Yannick (2007), The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 2, p. 397-407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2007Journal name
Games and Economic BehaviorVolume
59Number
2Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
397-407
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Viossat, YannickAbstract (EN)
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeuxRelated items
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