The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria
Viossat, Yannick (2007), The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 2, p. 397-407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameGames and Economic Behavior
MetadataShow full item record
Abstract (EN)It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
Subjects / KeywordsThéorie des jeux
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