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The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria

Viossat, Yannick (2007), The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 2, p. 397-407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2007
Journal name
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
59
Number
2
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
397-407
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Viossat, Yannick
Abstract (EN)
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux
JEL
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games