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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

Viossat, Yannick (2014), Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 1, 3, p. 537-553. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2014
Journal name
Journal of Dynamics and Games
Volume
1
Number
3
Publisher
AIMS
Pages
537-553
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Viossat, Yannick
Abstract (EN)
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.
Subjects / Keywords
best-reply dynamics; replicator dynamics; Nash equilibrium
JEL
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory