A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
Forges, Françoise (2013), A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, 78, 1, p. 64-71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameGames and Economic Behavior
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Abstract (EN)The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Subjects / KeywordsBayesian game; commitment; contract; incentive compatibility; interim individual rationality
JELC70 - General
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