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dc.contributor.authorRobert, Christian P.
dc.contributor.authorGelman, Andrew
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-28T08:29:38Z
dc.date.available2013-02-28T08:29:38Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/11069
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectLaplace law of successionen
dc.subjectFrequentisten
dc.subjectFoundationsen
dc.subjectDoomsdsay argumenten
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC11en
dc.title"Not Only Defended But Also Applied" : The Perceived Absurdity of Bayesian Inference.en
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThe missionary zeal of many Bayesians of old has been matched, in the other direction, by an attitude among some theoreticians that Bayesian methods were absurd—not merely misguided but obviously wrong in principle. We consider several examples, beginning with Feller's classic text on probability theory and continuing with more recent cases such as the perceived Bayesian nature of the so-called doomsday argument. We analyze in this note the intellectual background behind various misconceptions about Bayesian statistics, without aiming at a complete historical coverage of the reasons for this dismissal.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameThe American Statistician
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol67en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2013
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-5en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2013.760987en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://arxiv.org/abs/1006.5366v5
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherAmerican Statistical Associationen
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


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