• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Aide
  • Connexion
  • Langue 
    • Français
    • English
Consulter le document 
  •   Accueil
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • Consulter le document
  •   Accueil
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • Consulter le document
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Afficher

Toute la baseCentres de recherche & CollectionsAnnée de publicationAuteurTitreTypeCette collectionAnnée de publicationAuteurTitreType

Mon compte

Connexion

Enregistrement

Statistiques

Documents les plus consultésStatistiques par paysAuteurs les plus consultés
Thumbnail - Request a copy

Multiagent resource allocation with sharable items

Airiau, Stéphane; Endriss, Ulle (2014), Multiagent resource allocation with sharable items, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 28, 6, p. 956-985. 10.1007/s10458-013-9245-x

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2014
Nom de la revue
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Volume
28
Numéro
6
Éditeur
Springer
Pages
956-985
Identifiant publication
10.1007/s10458-013-9245-x
Métadonnées
Afficher la notice complète
Auteur(s)
Airiau, Stéphane cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Endriss, Ulle
Résumé (EN)
We study a particular multiagent resource allocation problem with indivisible, but sharable resources. In our model, the utility of an agent for using a bundle of resources is the difference between the value the agent would assign to that bundle in isolation and a congestion cost that depends on the number of agents she has to share each of the resources in her bundle with. The valuation function determining the value and the delay function determining the congestion cost can be agent-dependent. When the agents that share a resource also share control over that resource, then the current users of a resource will require some compensation when a new agent wants to join them using the resource. For this scenario of shared control, we study the existence of distributed negotiation protocols that lead to a social optimum. Depending on constraints on the valuation functions (mainly modularity), on the delay functions (such as convexity), and on the structural complexity of the deals between agents, we prove either the existence of a sequences of deals leading to a social optimum or the convergence of all sequences of deals to such an optimum. We also analyse the length of the path leading to such optimal allocations. For scenarios where the agents using a resource do not have shared control over that resource (i.e., where any agent can use any resource she wants), we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria, i.e., allocations in which no single agent has an incentive to add or drop any of the resources she is currently holding. We provide results for modular valuation functions, we analyse the length of the paths leading to a pure Nash equilibrium, and we relate our findings to results from the literature on congestion games.
Mots-clés
Multiagent resource allocation; Congestion games

Publications associées

Affichage des éléments liés par titre et auteur.

  • Vignette de prévisualisation
    Multiagent Resource Allocation with Sharable Items: Simple Protocols and Nash Equilibria 
    Airiau, Stéphane; Endriss, Ulle (2010) Communication / Conférence
  • Vignette de prévisualisation
    Multiagent Resource Allocation with K -additive Utility Functions 
    Maudet, Nicolas; Estivie, Sylvia; Endriss, Ulle; Chevaleyre, Yann (2004) Communication / Conférence
  • Vignette de prévisualisation
    Multiagent Resource Allocation with K-additive Utility Functions 
    Chevaleyre, Yann; Endriss, Ulle; Estivie, Sylvia; Maudet, Nicolas (2004) Document de travail / Working paper
  • Vignette de prévisualisation
    Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity 
    Estivie, Sylvia; Endriss, Ulle; Chevaleyre, Yann; Maudet, Nicolas (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Vignette de prévisualisation
    Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation 
    Chevaleyre, Yann; Dunne, Paul; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jérôme; Lemaître, Michel; Maudet, Nicolas; Padget, Julian; Phelps, Steve; Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A.; Sousa, Paulo (2006) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Tél. : 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo