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Locally lipschitz cooperative games

Aubin, Jean-Pierre (1981), Locally lipschitz cooperative games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 8, 3, p. 241-262. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(81)90004-5

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
1981
Journal name
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume
8
Number
3
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
241-262
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Aubin, Jean-Pierre
Abstract (EN)
A locally Lipschitz cooperative generalized game is described by its coalition worth function v defined on the set [0, 1]n of generalized (or fuzzy) coalitions of n players. We assume that v is positively homogeneous and locally Lipschitz. We propose the Clarke's generalized gradient ∂v(cN) of v at the coalition cN=(1,…,1) of all players as a set of solutions, and we study its property. We point out that it coincides with the core when v is super–additive and to the Shapley value when v is smooth.
Subjects / Keywords
cooperative games