Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, B.

Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, B. (1982), Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1, p. 115-145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-X

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

1982

Journal name

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volume

Number

Publisher

Elsevier

Pages

115-145

Abstract (EN)

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability notion generalizes the familiar core of a simple game. We study those effectivity functions yielding a non-empty core for all preference profiles, of which additive effectivity functions are an example. This proves to be closely related to implementation by means of the strong equilibrium concept.

Subjects / Keywords

cooperative games

JEL

C71 - Cooperative Games