Implementing just and efficient decision-making

dc.contributor.author	Moulin, Hervé
dc.date.accessioned	2014-05-19T08:41:00Z
dc.date.available	2014-05-19T08:41:00Z
dc.date.issued	1981
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13315
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision	en
dc.subject	decision-making mechanisms	en
dc.subject.ddc	519	en
dc.title	Implementing just and efficient decision-making	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstracten	In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	Journal of Public Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	16	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	2	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	1981
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	193-213	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(81)90024-4	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Elsevier	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées	en
dc.relation.forthcoming	non	en
dc.relation.forthcomingprint	non	en

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