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Deterrence and cooperation: A classification of two-person games

Moulin, Hervé (1981), Deterrence and cooperation: A classification of two-person games, European Economic Review, 15, 2, p. 179-193. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(81)90086-6

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
1981
Journal name
European Economic Review
Volume
15
Number
2
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
179-193
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Moulin, Hervé
Abstract (EN)
In two-person games in normal, bilateral threats succeed in self-enforcing any imputation. We discriminate among imputations by looking at various features of deterring threats. As a result we obtain a classification of two-person games. Finally a duopoly example is analysed.
Subjects / Keywords
two-person games