Deterrence and cooperation: A classification of two-person games

dc.contributor.author	Moulin, Hervé
dc.date.accessioned	2014-05-19T08:41:36Z
dc.date.available	2014-05-19T08:41:36Z
dc.date.issued	1981
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13316
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	two-person games	en
dc.subject.ddc	519	en
dc.title	Deterrence and cooperation: A classification of two-person games	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstracten	In two-person games in normal, bilateral threats succeed in self-enforcing any imputation. We discriminate among imputations by looking at various features of deterring threats. As a result we obtain a classification of two-person games. Finally a duopoly example is analysed.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	European Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	15	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	2	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	1981
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	179-193	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(81)90086-6	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Elsevier	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées	en
dc.relation.forthcoming	non	en
dc.relation.forthcomingprint	non	en

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