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Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results

Moulin, Hervé (1982), Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results, Mathematical Social Sciences, 3, 3, p. 243-257. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
1982
Journal name
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
3
Number
3
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
243-257
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Moulin, Hervé
Abstract (EN)
Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are reviewed in three familiar economically meaningful contexts: ordinal (as in voting), random (as in bargaining) and quasilinear (as in public goods problems).
Subjects / Keywords
Decentralized decision making; incentive compatibility; strategyproof; dominant strategy; maximin strategy; dominance solvability