Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results

dc.contributor.author	Moulin, Hervé
dc.date.accessioned	2014-05-19T08:42:08Z
dc.date.available	2014-05-19T08:42:08Z
dc.date.issued	1982
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13317
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Decentralized decision making	en
dc.subject	incentive compatibility	en
dc.subject	strategyproof	en
dc.subject	dominant strategy	en
dc.subject	maximin strategy	en
dc.subject	dominance solvability	en
dc.subject.ddc	519	en
dc.title	Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstracten	Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are reviewed in three familiar economically meaningful contexts: ordinal (as in voting), random (as in bargaining) and quasilinear (as in public goods problems).	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	Mathematical Social Sciences
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	3	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	3	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	1982
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	243-257	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Elsevier	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées	en
dc.relation.forthcoming	non	en
dc.relation.forthcomingprint	non	en

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