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hal.structure.identifierESSEC Business School
dc.contributor.authorArcot, Sridhar*
hal.structure.identifierDauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
dc.contributor.authorFluck, Zsuzsanna*
hal.structure.identifierESSEC Business School
dc.contributor.authorGaspar, José-Miguel*
hal.structure.identifierInstitut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales [Carthage] [IHEC]
dc.contributor.authorHege, Ulrich*
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-12T08:42:12Z
dc.date.available2014-09-12T08:42:12Z
dc.date.issued2015-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13942
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectLeveraged buyoutsen
dc.subjectSecondary buyoutsen
dc.subjectPrivate equityen
dc.subjectLimited investment horizonen
dc.subjectAgency conflicts in fund managementen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G35en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G32en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G1.G11
dc.titleFund Managers under pressure: Rationale and Determinants of Secondary Buyoutsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherESSEC Business School;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherMichigan State University;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherHEC;France
dc.description.abstractenThe fastest growing segment of private equity (PE) deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs)—sales from one PE fund to another. Using a comprehensive sample of leveraged buyouts, we investigate whether SBOs are value-maximizing, or reflect opportunistic behavior. To proxy for adverse incentives, we develop buy and sell pressure indexes based on how close PE funds are to the end of their investment period or lifetime, their unused capital, reputation, deal activity, and fundraising frequency. We report that funds under pressure engage more in SBOs. Pressured buyers pay higher multiples, use less leverage, and syndicate less suggesting that their motive is to spend equity. Pressured sellers exit at lower multiples and have shorter holding periods. When pressured counterparties meet, deal multiples depend on differential bargaining power. Moreover, funds that invested under pressure underperform.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Financial Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol115en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015-01
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages102–135en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.08.002en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
hal.identifierhal-01453163*
hal.version1*
hal.update.actionupdateMetadata*
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