Show simple item record

Negotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industry

dc.contributor.authorBensaid, Bernard
dc.contributor.authorGary-Bobo, Robert J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-25T15:51:08Z
dc.date.available2014-11-25T15:51:08Z
dc.date.issued1991
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/14305
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectgame-theoretic oligopoly modelen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleNegotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industryen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe examine the properties of profit-sharing in a game-theoretic oligopoly model of industry. Profit-sharing contracts are viewed as a means of strategic commitment, not as an internal incentive system. In our model, firms choose a contract subject to the employees' participation constraint in a first stage, and compete on the output market in a second stage. We show that the choice of a profit-sharing contract by each firm is a non-cooperative equilibrium. In the case of Cournot competition, the game under study has the structure of the Prisoners' Dilemma. The case of price competition on the output market leads to somewhat different conclusions.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEuropean Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol35en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue5en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate1991
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1069-1085en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(91)90005-4en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record