Evolution of viable allocations
Aubin, Jean-Pierre (1991), Evolution of viable allocations, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 16, 1-2, p. 183-215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(91)90048-3
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
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Abstract (EN)The decentralized evolution of allocations of resources among consumers described by their change functions is characterized by a regulation rule associating with each allocation the subset prices regulating them. Sufficient budgetary conditions, analogous to the Walras law, for the viability of such evolutions are then provided. Next, the issue of finding feedback controls is tackled: Conditions under which slow evolutions are given. More to the point, dynamical feedback controls obeying the inertia principle are provided: Prices are changed only when the viability of the evolution mechanism is at stake. We then derive the differential equations governing the heavy evolution of prices: For a given bound on inflation rates, the price evolves with minimal velocity.
Subjects / Keywordsallocations of resources; Price evolution
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