Judge: Don't Vote!
Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2014), Judge: Don't Vote!, Operations Research, 62, 3, p. 483-511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameOperations Research
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Abstract (EN)This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.
Subjects / Keywordsmethods of electing and ranking; Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes; strategic manipulation; faithful representation; meaningful measurement; figure skating; presidential elections; jury decision
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