Judge: Don't Vote!

Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida

Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2014), Judge: Don't Vote!, Operations Research, 62, 3, p. 483-511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1269

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Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2014

Journal name

Operations Research

Volume

Number

Publisher

INFORMS

Pages

483-511

Abstract (EN)

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

Subjects / Keywords

methods of electing and ranking; Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes; strategic manipulation; faithful representation; meaningful measurement; figure skating; presidential elections; jury decision

JEL

C72 - Noncooperative Games
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations