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hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorVigeral, Guillaume
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
dc.contributor.authorViossat, Yannick
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-30T15:50:20Z
dc.date.available2016-05-30T15:50:20Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn0167-6377
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/15510
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectSemi-algebraic setsen
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen
dc.subjectEquilibrium payoffsen
dc.subjectBinary gamesen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleSemi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenAny nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0,1]^n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The proofs are constructive and elementary.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameOperations Research Letters
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol44en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2016
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages19-24en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.002en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01895en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2016-05-30T13:49:55Z
hal.hide.repecnonen
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