Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
Forges, Françoise (2006), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Theory and Decision, 61, 4, p. 329-344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2006-08Journal name
Theory and DecisionVolume
61Number
4Publisher
Springer
Pages
329-344
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Forges, FrançoiseAbstract (EN)
A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux; Analyse bayésienneRelated items
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