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Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

Forges, Françoise (2006), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Theory and Decision, 61, 4, p. 329-344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2006-08
Journal name
Theory and Decision
Volume
61
Number
4
Publisher
Springer
Pages
329-344
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Forges, Françoise
Abstract (EN)
A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.
Subjects / Keywords
Théorie des jeux; Analyse bayésienne
JEL
C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General