• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LAMSADE (UMR CNRS 7243)
  • LAMSADE : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail - No thumbnail

An axiomatic approach to social ranking under coalitional power relations

Moretti, Stefano (2015), An axiomatic approach to social ranking under coalitional power relations, Homo Oeconomicus, 32, 2, p. 183-208

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
External document link
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00874319
Date
2015
Journal name
Homo Oeconomicus
Volume
32
Number
2
Pages
183-208
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Moretti, Stefano cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
In the literature of coalitional games, power indices have been widely used to assess the influence that a player has in situations where coalitions may be winning or losing. However, in many cases things are not so simple as that: in some practical situations, all that we know about coalitions is a relative comparison of strength. For instance, we know that a football team is stronger than another team, a political party is more reliable than another party, an evaluation committee is more representative than another one, and so on, but we are not able to determine which teams, parties, or committees share the characteristics to be winning (or loosing) in general. Still, in those situations we could be interested to rank single individuals according to their ability to influence the relative strength of coalitions. In this direction, we introduce a different coalitional framework where we analyse a new notion of ordinal power "index" or social ranking by associating to each total preorder on the set of all coalitions (representing the relative power of coalitions) a ranking over the player set. We study some properties for this class of social rankings, and we provide axiomatic characterizations of particular ones showing close affinities with the classical Banzhaf index of coalitional games.
Subjects / Keywords
ordinal power; social ranking; coalitional games; Banzhaf index
JEL
C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    Ordinal power relations and social rankings 
    Moretti, Stefano; Ozturk, Meltem (2016) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Coalitional games on biological networks to measure the power of genes 
    Moretti, Stefano; Fragnelli, Vito; Patrone, Fioravante; Bonassi, Stefano (2010) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Using coalitional games on biological networks to measure centrality and power of genes 
    Moretti, Stefano; Fragnelli, Vito; Patrone, Fioravante; Bonassi, Stefano (2010) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Some Axiomatic and Algorithmic Perspectives on the Social Ranking Problem 
    Moretti, Stefano; Ozturk, Meltem (2017) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    An axiomatic approach to bibliometric rankings and indices 
    Marchant, Thierry; Bouyssou, Denis (2014) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo