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Project selection: Commitment and competition

Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha (2016), Project selection: Commitment and competition, Games and Economic Behavior, 96, p. 30-48. 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.011

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2016
Journal name
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
96
Publisher
Academic Press
Pages
30-48
Publication identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.011
Metadata
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Author(s)
Atal, Vidya

Bar, Talia

Gordon, Sidartha
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Abstract (EN)
We examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when the value of the project is the same for both firms. A monopolist rejects more projects, and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist. Duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior. We extend the model to allow for externalities, asymmetry, and n>2n>2 firms.
Subjects / Keywords
Project selection; Search; Commitment; Markov perfect equilibrium
JEL
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory

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