Profitable Deviation Strong Equilibria
Gourvès, Laurent (2015), Profitable Deviation Strong Equilibria, in Toby Walsh, Algorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Lexington, KY, USA, September 27-30, 2015, Proceedings, Springer : Berlin Heidelberg, p. 236-252. 10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_15
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Book titleAlgorithmic Decision Theory - 4th International Conference, ADT 2015, Lexington, KY, USA, September 27-30, 2015, Proceedings
Book authorToby Walsh
MetadataShow full item record
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)This paper deals with states that are immune to group deviations. Group deviations help the players of a strategic game to escape from undesirable states but they compromise the stability of a system. We propose and analyse a solution concept, called profitable deviation strong equilibrium, which is between two well-known equilibria: the strong equilibrium and the super strong equilibrium. The former precludes joint deviations by groups of players who all benefit. The latter is more demanding in the sense that at least one member of a deviating coalition must be better off while the other members cannot be worst off. We study the existence, computation and convergence to a profitable deviation strong equilibrium in three important games in algorithmic game theory: job scheduling, max cut and singleton congestion game.
Subjects / KeywordsAlgorithmic game theory; Equilibrium; Group deviation
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