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Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games

Escoffier, Bruno; Ferraioli, Diodato; Gourvès, Laurent; Moretti, Stefano (2013), Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games, in Vöcking, Berthold, Algorithmic Game Theory, Springer : Berlin Heidelberg, p. 207-218. 10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_18

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2013
Conference title
6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013
Conference date
2013-10
Conference city
Aachen
Conference country
Germany
Book title
Algorithmic Game Theory
Book author
Vöcking, Berthold
Publisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN
978-3-642-41391-9
Number of pages
266
Pages
207-218
Publication identifier
10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_18
Metadata
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Author(s)
Escoffier, Bruno
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Ferraioli, Diodato
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Gourvès, Laurent
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Moretti, Stefano cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
Network coordination games (NCGs) have recently received a lot of attention since they model several kinds of interaction problems in social networks. However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) for NCGs. Specifically, we would like to assign to players special fees in order to induce the optimum profile of an NCG. Moreover, we would like the mechanism to be budget-balanced, i.e., implementable with no cost.We show that a budget-balanced and incentive compatible best- response mechanism for inducing the optimal profile of a two-strategy NCG always exists. Moreover, for such a mechanism, we investigate other properties inspired by envy-freeness, collusion-resistance and fairness.
Subjects / Keywords
théorie des jeux
JEL
C70 - General

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