Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games
Escoffier, Bruno; Ferraioli, Diodato; Gourvès, Laurent; Moretti, Stefano (2013), Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games, in Vöcking, Berthold, Algorithmic Game Theory, Springer : Berlin Heidelberg, p. 207-218. 10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_18
Type
Communication / ConférenceDate
2013Conference title
6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013Conference date
2013-10Conference city
AachenConference country
GermanyBook title
Algorithmic Game TheoryBook author
Vöcking, BertholdPublisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN
978-3-642-41391-9
Number of pages
266Pages
207-218
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Escoffier, BrunoLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Ferraioli, Diodato
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Gourvès, Laurent
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Moretti, Stefano

Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
Network coordination games (NCGs) have recently received a lot of attention since they model several kinds of interaction problems in social networks. However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) for NCGs. Specifically, we would like to assign to players special fees in order to induce the optimum profile of an NCG. Moreover, we would like the mechanism to be budget-balanced, i.e., implementable with no cost.We show that a budget-balanced and incentive compatible best- response mechanism for inducing the optimal profile of a two-strategy NCG always exists. Moreover, for such a mechanism, we investigate other properties inspired by envy-freeness, collusion-resistance and fairness.Subjects / Keywords
théorie des jeuxJEL
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