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hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorSalomon, Antoine
hal.structure.identifierCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-17T15:11:17Z
dc.date.available2017-01-17T15:11:17Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16175
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDiscountingen
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen
dc.subjectPublic gooden
dc.subjectRepeated gameen
dc.subjectReputationen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelH41en
dc.titleBayesian repeated games and reputationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player privately knows his own payoffs (private values). Under a further assumption (existence of uniform punishment strategies), the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players. We show that in a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become increasingly patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of two-sided reputation models.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol159en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2015
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages70-104en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00803919en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidatenonen
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2016-12-05T14:23:04Z
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


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