Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
Forges, Françoise; Horst, Ulrich; Salomon, Antoine (2016), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, International Journal of Game Theory, 45, 1, p. 11-36. 10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéExternal document link
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01094061Date
2016Journal name
International Journal of Game TheoryVolume
45Number
1Publisher
Springer
Pages
11-36
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Forges, FrançoiseCEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Horst, Ulrich
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Salomon, Antoine
Abstract (EN)
We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a “uniform punishment strategy” against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We also consider the extension of the result when both players have private information.Subjects / Keywords
Commitment; cooperative solution; joint plan equilibrium; Folk theorem; private informationRelated items
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