Show simple item record

hal.structure.identifierCentre d'économie de la Sorbonne [CES]
dc.contributor.authorBich, Philippe
HAL ID: 12752
ORCID: 0000-0001-9011-7437
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
dc.contributor.authorLaraki, Rida
HAL ID: 179670
ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-07T12:31:03Z
dc.date.available2017-03-07T12:31:03Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16292
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDiscontinuous gamesen
dc.subjectbetter-reply securityen
dc.subjectsharing rulesen
dc.subjectapproximate equilibriumen
dc.subjectReny equilibriumen
dc.subjectstrategic approximationen
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subjecttiming gamesen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C7.C72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C6.C62en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C0.C02en
dc.titleOn the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper studies the existence of some known equilibrium solution concepts in a large class of economic models with discontinuous payoff functions. The issue is well understood for Nash equilibria, thanks to Reny's better-reply security condition, and its recent improvements. We propose new approaches, related to Reny's work, and obtain tight conditions for the existence of an approximate equilibrium and of a sharing rule solution in pure and mixed strategies (Simon and Zame). As byproducts, we prove that many auction games with correlated types admit an approximate equilibrium, and that many competition models with discontinuous preferences have a sharing rule solution.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameTheoretical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol12en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2017-01
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages79-108en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.3982/TE2081en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSociety for Economic Theoryen
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedouien
dc.date.updated2017-03-06T14:08:56Z
hal.identifierhal-01484557*
hal.version1*
hal.author.functionaut
hal.author.functionaut


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record