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Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots

Baumeister, Dorothea; Faliszewski, Piotr; Lang, Jérôme; Rothe, Jörg (2012), Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots, in Padgham, Lin; van der Hoek, Wiebe; Conitzer, Vincent; Winikoff, Michael, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012) - Volume 2, IFAAMAS, p. 577-584

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1D_2.pdf (164.2Kb)
Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2012
Conference title
11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012)
Conference date
2012-06
Conference city
Valencia
Conference country
Spain
Book title
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012) - Volume 2
Book author
Padgham, Lin; van der Hoek, Wiebe; Conitzer, Vincent; Winikoff, Michael
Publisher
IFAAMAS
ISBN
978-0-9817381-2-3
Number of pages
1508
Pages
577-584
Metadata
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Author(s)
Baumeister, Dorothea
Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Faliszewski, Piotr
Department of Automatics [AGH-UST]
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Rothe, Jörg
Institut für Informatik [Düsseldorf]
Abstract (EN)
We study elections in which voters may submit partial ballots consisting of truncated lists: each voter ranks some of her top candidates (and possibly some of her bottom candidates) and is indifferent among the remaining ones. Holding elections with such votes requires adapting classical voting rules (which expect complete rankings as input) and these adaptations create various opportunities for candidates who want to increase their chances of winning. We provide complexity results regarding planning various kinds of campaigns in such settings, and we study the complexity of the possible winner problem for the case of truncated votes.
Subjects / Keywords
theory; social choice; elections; manipulation; possible winner; bribery

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