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New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy

Lang, Jérôme; Maudet, Nicolas; Polukarov, Maria (2013), New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacy, in Vöcking, Berthold, Algorithmic Game Theory, Proceedings, Springer : Berlin Heidelberg, p. 13-25. 10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_2

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2013
Conference title
6th International Symposium, SAGT 2013
Conference date
2013-10
Conference city
Aachen
Conference country
Germany
Book title
Algorithmic Game Theory, Proceedings
Book author
Vöcking, Berthold
Publisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN
978-3-642-41391-9
Number of pages
266
Pages
13-25
Publication identifier
10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_2
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Maudet, Nicolas cc
Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6 [LIP6]
Polukarov, Maria
University of Southampton
Abstract (EN)
We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action where all candidates enter the election is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They also showed that for voting trees, there are candidacy games with no pure strategy equilibria. However, no results were known about other voting rules. Here we prove several such results. Some are positive (a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for Copeland and the uncovered set, whichever is the number of candidates, and for all Condorcet-consistent rules, for 4 candidates). Some are negative, namely for plurality and maximin.
Subjects / Keywords
social choice; voting

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