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When the Dust Settles: The Consequences of Scandals for Organizational Competition

Piazza, A.; Jourdan, Julien (2018), When the Dust Settles: The Consequences of Scandals for Organizational Competition, Academy of Management Journal, 61, 1, p. 165-190. 10.5465/amj.2015.1325

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2018
Journal name
Academy of Management Journal
Volume
61
Number
1
Publisher
Academy of Management
Pages
165-190
Publication identifier
10.5465/amj.2015.1325
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Piazza, A.
Jourdan, Julien
Abstract (EN)
Recent works have documented the dark side of scandals, revealing how they spread, contaminate associated organizations, and taint the perception of entire fields. We complement this line of work by exploring how scandals durably affect competition within a field, translating into relative advantages for certain organizations over others. First, scandals may benefit organizations that provide a close substitute to the offerings of the implicated organization. Second, scandals pave the way for moralizing discourses and practices, shake taken-for-granted assumptions about the conduct of organizations, and result in a shift in the criteria used to evaluate organizations within the field. Our arguments suggest that organizations whose offerings are most similar to those of the implicated organization, yet perceived as enforcing stricter standards of conduct, are likely to benefit the most from a scandal. We find support for these arguments in a county-level study of membership in the Catholic Church and sixteen other Christian denominations in the United States in the wake of a series of sex abuse cases perpetrated by Catholic clergy between 1971 and 2000. This study contributes to our understanding of the competitive effects of scandals on organizations, and carries important implications for the management of organizations in scandal-stricken fields.
Subjects / Keywords
organizational scandals; competition; strategy; religious organizations
JEL
D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
J53 - Labor–Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
K40 - General

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