Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices
Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios (2017), Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119, 2, p. 346-374. 10.1111/sjoe.12175
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2017Journal name
The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume
119Number
2Pages
346-374
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Nunez, MatiasLaboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Xefteris, Dimitrios
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies one-person-one-vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament. Parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold. We show a) that there generically exist equilibria in which all parties get a non-degenerate vote-share and, perhaps more importantly, b) that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device which crucially affects the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party. In particular we argue that the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party are decreasing in the size of the entry threshold.Subjects / Keywords
strategic voting; entry thresholds; Poisson gamesRelated items
Showing items related by title and author.
-
Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios (2017) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Jouaber, Kaouther; Mehri, Meryem (2012-11) Document de travail / Working paper
-
Pillon, Jean-Marie (2018) Chapitre d'ouvrage
-
Pillon, Jean-Marie (2018) Chapitre d'ouvrage
-
Roy, Bernard; Figueira, José; Almeida Dias, Juscelino (2014) Article accepté pour publication ou publié