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Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices

Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios (2017), Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119, 2, p. 346-374. 10.1111/sjoe.12175

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2017
Journal name
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume
119
Number
2
Pages
346-374
Publication identifier
10.1111/sjoe.12175
Metadata
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Author(s)
Nunez, Matias
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Xefteris, Dimitrios
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies one-person-one-vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament. Parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold. We show a) that there generically exist equilibria in which all parties get a non-degenerate vote-share and, perhaps more importantly, b) that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device which crucially affects the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party. In particular we argue that the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party are decreasing in the size of the entry threshold.
Subjects / Keywords
strategic voting; entry thresholds; Poisson games

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