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Majority Judgment: Measuring Ranking and Electing

Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida (2011), Majority Judgment: Measuring Ranking and Electing, p. 414

Type
Ouvrage
Date
2011
Published in
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England
ISBN
978-0-262-01513-4
Pages
414
Metadata
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Author(s)
Balinski, Michel

Laraki, Rida cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model—transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method--majority judgment—proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm—to evaluate.
Subjects / Keywords
Social Choice; Voting Systems; Political Science; Game Theory
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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