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Strategic voting and the logic of knowledge

van Ditmarsch, Hans; Lang, Jérôme; Saffidine, Abdallah (2012), Strategic voting and the logic of knowledge, in Padgham, Lin; van der Hoek, Wiebe, AAMAS '12 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM : Chicago, p. 1247-1248

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2012
Conference title
11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 12)
Conference date
2012-06
Conference city
Valencia
Conference country
Spain
Book title
AAMAS '12 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Book author
Padgham, Lin; van der Hoek, Wiebe
Publisher
ACM
Published in
Chicago
ISBN
978-0-9817381-3-0
Number of pages
1508
Pages
1247-1248
Metadata
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Author(s)
van Ditmarsch, Hans
Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications [LORIA]
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Saffidine, Abdallah
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model action changing knowledge about votes, such as a voter revealing its preference or as a central authority performing a voting poll. Some forms of manipulation are preserved under such updates and others not. Another form of knowledge dynamics is the effect of a voter declaring its vote. We envisage Stackelberg games for uncertain profiles. The purpose of this investigation is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting rules that incorporate uncertainty.
Subjects / Keywords
social choice; voting; epistemic logic; dynamics

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