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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-25T13:31:15Z
dc.date.available2009-05-25T13:31:15Z
dc.date.issued2006-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/166
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectThéorie des jeuxen
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.classificationjelC7en
dc.titleFeasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowmentsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe propose two classes of allocation games for N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agents’ private information. In both models, agents make non-verifiable claims about their types and effective deposits of consumption goods, which are redistributed by the planner. In a W-allocation game, the agents can withhold part of their endowment, namely consume whatever they do not deposit. In a D-allocation game, the agents can just destroypart of their endowment. W- and D- incentive compatible (I.C.) direct allocation mechanisms ask every agent to reveal his type and to make a deposit consistent with his reported type. The revelation principle holds in full generality for D-I.C. mechanisms but some care is needed for W-I.C. mechanisms. We further investigate the properties of both classes of mechanisms under common assumptions like non-exclusive information and/or constant aggregate endowment. In T.U. economies, W-I.C. and D-I.C. mechanisms are ex ante equivalent.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameSocial Choice and Welfare
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol26en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006-04
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages403-419en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0107-1en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie politiqueen


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