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Kinetic description of strategic binary games

Salvarani, Francesco; Tonon, Daniela (2017-04), Kinetic description of strategic binary games. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/16884

Type
Document de travail / Working paper
External document link
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01503673
Date
2017-04
Series title
Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine
Pages
26
Metadata
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Author(s)
Salvarani, Francesco
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Dipartimento di matematica F. Casorati
Tonon, Daniela
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Abstract (EN)
In this article, we study the behavior of a population composed by rational individuals , which interact through a binary game. After deducing the kinetic description of the system, we study existence and uniqueness of the resulting equation. We then focus our attention on a linear game and provide its asymptotics in the high-frequency and vanishing payoff case. Several numerical simulations show the quantitative behavior of the model.
Subjects / Keywords
binary game; kinetic