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Rule enforcement among peers : A lateral control regime

Lazega, Emmanuel (2000), Rule enforcement among peers : A lateral control regime, Organization Studies, 21, 1, p. 193-214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840600211003

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2000
Journal name
Organization Studies
Volume
21
Number
1
Publisher
Sage
Pages
193-214
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840600211003
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Lazega, Emmanuel cc
Abstract (EN)
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of control among peers. Drawing on a network study of a medium-sized Northeastern U.S. corporate law firm, this work shows that partners — all formally equal and locked in a cooperative situation — have developed an informal `lateral control regime' to help protect their common interests against free loading due to individual expressive problems. This regime helps peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by reducing costs of control. It maintains low costs through appropriate use of social resources or `relationships' between members. Sanctioners are chosen because they are structurally close to the infractors, but often also because they are relatively more powerful. Some of the costs of control are shown to be shifted to partners with a specific form of status within the firm, that of uncontroversial `protectors of the common good'. These main sanctioners help prevent situations in which infractors would be reserved preferential treatment because they control resources too important to their close partners.
Subjects / Keywords
Lateral control; Collegial organization; Social control; Lateral control; Network analysis; Three way data
JEL
Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
A14 - Sociology of Economics

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