Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
Hernández Santibáñez, Nicolás; Possamaï, Dylan; Zhou, Chao (2017), Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/17210
TypeDocument de travail / Working paper
External document linkhttps://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01435460
Series titleCahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine
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Abstract (EN)In this paper, we extend the optimal securitization model of Pagès and Possamaï and Pagès between an investor and a bank to a setting allowing both moral hazard and adverse selection. Following the recent approach to these problems of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang, we characterize explicitly and rigorously the so-called credible set of the continuation and temptation values of the bank, and obtain the value function of the investor as well as the optimal contracts through a recursive system of first-order variational inequalities with gradient constraints. We provide a detailed discussion of the properties of the optimal menu of contracts.
Subjects / Keywordsmoral hazard; bank monitoring; securitization; adverse selection; principal-agent problem
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