Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
Laslier, Jean-François; Nunez, Matias; Pimienta, Carlos (2017), Reaching consensus through approval bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, p. 241-251. 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002
TypeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
Journal nameGames and Economic Behavior
MetadataShow full item record
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques [PSE]
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
UNSW Business School
Abstract (EN)In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.
Subjects / KeywordsApproval voting; Bargaining; Partial honesty; Consensual equilibrium
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