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dc.contributor.authorKoessler, Frédéric
HAL ID: 740979
ORCID: 0000-0001-7707-4217
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-29T13:30:57Z
dc.date.available2009-05-29T13:30:57Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/179
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectInformation privéeen
dc.subjectjeux non-coopératifsen
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleLong persuasion gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherCergy-Pontoise;France
dc.description.abstractenThis paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619–1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol143en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-05
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-35en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie politiqueen


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