Why do surviving targets leverage so much after an acquisistion? A governance explaination
de La Bruslerie, Hubert (2018), Why do surviving targets leverage so much after an acquisistion? A governance explaination, AFFI 35th International Conference, Paris, FRANCE
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference titleAFFI 35th International Conference
MetadataShow full item record
Author(s)de La Bruslerie, Hubert
Dauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
Abstract (EN)Surviving public firms after an acquisition will show important changes as the new controller generally undertakes investment and reorganization decisions to create additional value and seize synergies. An important issue is to balance a creditor’s holdup mechanism with the possibility for the creditors to capture a part of the synergy gains at the target’s level. We demonstrate empirically that an increase in leverage is developed to limit a transfer of value to creditors. The changes in financing structure are implemented shortly after the acquisition.
Subjects / KeywordsTransfer of value; Leverage; Creditor’s holdup; Target firms; Acquisitions
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