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Implementing Pareto optimal and individually rational outcomes by veto

Sanver, Remzi (2018), Implementing Pareto optimal and individually rational outcomes by veto, Group Decision and Negotiation, 27, 2, p. 223-233. 10.1007/s10726-018-9562-1

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2018
Journal name
Group Decision and Negotiation
Volume
27
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
223-233
Publication identifier
10.1007/s10726-018-9562-1
Metadata
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Author(s)
Sanver, Remzi
Abstract (EN)
We introduce a simple veto mechanism where each agent can veto any subset of alternatives, by paying a veto cost for each vetoed alternative. The outcome is the set of non-vetoed alternatives or, if this set is empty, some previously fixed alternative which is declared the disagreement outcome. Under fairly mild axioms to extend individual preferences over alternatives to sets of alternatives and assuming quasi-linear preferences over outcome-money bundles, we show that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the veto mechanism coincide with the Pareto optimal outcomes which are individually rational according to the disagreement outcome. The positive result prevails when individual preferences admit indifferences and even for the case of two agents. We also show that under stronger axioms to extend preferences over alternatives to sets, strong Nash implementation (hence double implementation) is also possible with the same veto mechanism.
Subjects / Keywords
Nash implementation; Veto mechanism; Two-person implementation; Implementation with awards

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