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Implementing Pareto optimal and individually rational outcomes by veto

dc.contributor.authorSanver, Remzi
HAL ID: 184266
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-08T14:28:00Z
dc.date.available2019-04-08T14:28:00Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/18617
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectNash implementation
dc.subjectVeto mechanism
dc.subjectTwo-person implementation
dc.subjectImplementation with awards
dc.subject.ddc003en
dc.titleImplementing Pareto optimal and individually rational outcomes by veto
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe introduce a simple veto mechanism where each agent can veto any subset of alternatives, by paying a veto cost for each vetoed alternative. The outcome is the set of non-vetoed alternatives or, if this set is empty, some previously fixed alternative which is declared the disagreement outcome. Under fairly mild axioms to extend individual preferences over alternatives to sets of alternatives and assuming quasi-linear preferences over outcome-money bundles, we show that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the veto mechanism coincide with the Pareto optimal outcomes which are individually rational according to the disagreement outcome. The positive result prevails when individual preferences admit indifferences and even for the case of two agents. We also show that under stronger axioms to extend preferences over alternatives to sets, strong Nash implementation (hence double implementation) is also possible with the same veto mechanism.
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGroup Decision and Negotiation
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol27
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2018
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages223-233
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s10726-018-9562-1
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringer
dc.subject.ddclabelRecherche opérationnelleen
dc.relation.forthcomingnonen
dc.relation.forthcomingprintnonen
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
dc.date.updated2020-06-12T09:46:32Z
hal.identifierhal-02093118*
hal.version1*
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