
Selfish Transportation Games
Fotakis, Dimitris; Gourvès, Laurent; Monnot, Jérôme (2017), Selfish Transportation Games, in Steffen, Bernhard; Baier, Christel; van den Brand, Mark; Eder, Johann; Hinchey, Mike; Margaria, Tiziana, SOFSEM 2017: Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Proceedings, Springer International Publishing : Cham, p. 176-187. 10.1007/978-3-319-51963-0_14
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Type
Communication / ConférenceDate
2017Conference title
43rd International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2017)Conference date
2017-01Conference city
LimerickConference country
IrelandBook title
SOFSEM 2017: Theory and Practice of Computer Science, ProceedingsBook author
Steffen, Bernhard; Baier, Christel; van den Brand, Mark; Eder, Johann; Hinchey, Mike; Margaria, TizianaPublisher
Springer International Publishing
Published in
Cham
ISBN
978-3-319-51962-3
Number of pages
526Pages
176-187
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Fotakis, DimitrisSchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens [ICCS]
Gourvès, Laurent
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme

Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
We study a natural strategic situation arising from the selection of shared means of transportation. Some clients (the players) are located on different nodes of a given graph and they want to be transported from their location to a common destination point (e.g. school, airport). A fixed number of resources (also called buses) is available and each client has to choose exactly one. Individual costs depend on the route chosen by the buses and the distance between the nodes. We investigate the case where each bus has a static permutation which prescribes the order by which the clients are visited. We identify the cases admitting a pure strategy equilibrium and consider the construction of an equilibrium, via a dedicated algorithm, or a dynamics. We also determine the price of anarchy and the price of stability for two natural social functions.Subjects / Keywords
resource allocation game; existence and computation of equilibria; price of anarchy/stabilityRelated items
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