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Knowledge, Fairness, and Social Constraints

Aziz, Haris; Bouveret, Sylvain; Caragiannis, Ioannis; Giagkousi, Ira; Lang, Jérôme (2018), Knowledge, Fairness, and Social Constraints, in Zilberstein, Shlomo, Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18), AAAI Press / IJCAI : Palo Alto (USA), p. 4638-4645

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2018
Conference title
32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18)
Conference date
2018-02
Conference city
New Orleans, Louisiana
Conference country
United States
Book title
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18)
Book author
Zilberstein, Shlomo
Publisher
AAAI Press / IJCAI
Published in
Palo Alto (USA)
Pages
4638-4645
Metadata
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Author(s)
Aziz, Haris
University of South Wales
Bouveret, Sylvain cc
Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble [LIG]
Caragiannis, Ioannis
Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics [Patras]
Giagkousi, Ira
Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics [Patras]
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
In the context of fair allocation of indivisible items, fairness concepts often compare the satisfaction of an agent to the satisfaction she would have from items that are not allocated to her: in particular, envy-freeness requires that no agent prefers the share of someone else to her own share. We argue that these notions could also be defined relative to the knowledge that an agent has on how the items that she does not receive are distributed among other agents. We define a family of epistemic notions of envy-freeness, parameterized by a social graph, where an agent observes the share of her neighbours but not of her non-neighbours. We also define an intermediate notion between envy-freeness and proportionality, also parameterized by a social graph. These weaker notions of envy-freeness are useful when seeking a fair allocation, since envy-freeness is often too strong. We position these notions with respect to known ones, thus revealing new rich hierarchies of fairness concepts. Finally, we present a very general framework that covers all the existing and many new fairness concepts.
Subjects / Keywords
allocation problems; fair division; envy-freeness; proportionality; social networks

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