Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections
Barrot, Nathanaël; Lang, Jérôme; Yokoo, Makoto (2017), Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections, in Larson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund, Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017), IFAAMAS, p. 597-605
TypeCommunication / Conférence
Conference title16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
Conference citySão Paulo
Book titleProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
Book authorLarson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund
Number of pages1870
MetadataShow full item record
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed, ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the manipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.
Subjects / KeywordsApproval voting; Manipulation; Minisum; Minimax; Ordered weighted averaging
Showing items related by title and author.
Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability Amanatidis, Georgios; Barrot, Nathanaël; Lang, Jérôme; Markakis, Evangelos; Ries, Bernard (2015) Communication / Conférence
Vote par approbation pour les élections à vainqueurs multiples. Une famille générale de règles, leur complexité algorithmique et leur manipulabilité Barrot, Nathanaël; Lang, Jérôme; Ries, Bernard (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié