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Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections

Barrot, Nathanaël; Lang, Jérôme; Yokoo, Makoto (2017), Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections, in Larson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund, Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017), IFAAMAS, p. 597-605

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2017
Conference title
16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
Conference date
2017-05
Conference city
São Paulo
Conference country
Brazil
Book title
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
Book author
Larson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund
Publisher
IFAAMAS
Number of pages
1870
Pages
597-605
Metadata
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Author(s)
Barrot, Nathanaël
Kyushu, Japan
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Yokoo, Makoto
Kyushu, Japan
Abstract (EN)
Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed, ranging from a simple candidate-wise majority (minisum) to egalitarian rule (minimax). Even though the first rule is strategyproof and the second is not, due to its egalitarian nature, only a partial study on manipulation has been conducted for inbetween rules. This paper investigates the manipulability of fair rules within this family. We first prove that all rules parameterized by fair (non-increasing) weight vectors are manipulable, except minisum, if we consider them either resolute with a tie-breaking mechanism or irresolute with classic extension principles. Then, we conduct an empirical study of the proportion of elections that are manipulable, showing that it increases based on the rule's fairness.
Subjects / Keywords
Approval voting; Manipulation; Minisum; Minimax; Ordered weighted averaging

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    Barrot, Nathanaël; Lang, Jérôme; Ries, Bernard (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
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