Thumbnail - Request a copy

Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies

Lang, Jérôme; Monnot, Jérôme; Slinko, Arkadii; Zwicker, William (2017), Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies, in Larson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund, Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017), IFAAMAS, p. 24-32

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2017
Conference title
16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS '17)
Conference date
2017-05
Conference city
São Paulo
Conference country
Brazil
Book title
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
Book author
Larson, Kate; Winikoff, Michael; Das, Sanmay; Durfee, Edmund
Publisher
IFAAMAS
Number of pages
1870
Pages
24-32
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Slinko, Arkadii

Zwicker, William
Union College
Abstract (EN)
Classical voting rules output a winning alternative (or a nonempty set of tied alternatives). Social welfare functions output a ranking over alternatives. There are many practical situations where we have to output a different structure than a winner or a ranking: for instance, a ranked or non-ranked set of $k$ winning alternatives, or an ordered partition of alternatives. We define three classes of such aggregation functions, whose output can have any structure we want; we focus on aggregation functions that output dominating chains, dominating subsets, and dichotomies. We address the computation of our rules, and start studying their normative properties by focusing on a generalisation of Condorcet-consistency.
Subjects / Keywords
Graph theory; Graph algorithms analysis; Distributed artificial intelligence