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Project Games

Bilò, Vittorio; Gourvès, Laurent; Monnot, Jérôme (2019), Project Games, in Heggernes, Pinar, Algorithms and Complexity, Springer : Berlin Heidelberg, p. 75-86. 10.1007/978-3-030-17402-6_7

Type
Communication / Conférence
Date
2019
Conference title
11th International Conference, CIAC 2019
Conference date
2019-05
Conference city
Rome
Conference country
Italy
Book title
Algorithms and Complexity
Book author
Heggernes, Pinar
Publisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN
978-3-030-17401-9
Number of pages
378
Pages
75-86
Publication identifier
Metadata
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Author(s)
Bilò, Vittorio
Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi
Gourvès, Laurent
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Monnot, Jérôme cc
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Abstract (EN)
We consider a strategic game called project game where each agent has to choose a project among his own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors, according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.
Subjects / Keywords
Strategic games; Price of anarchy/stability; Congestion