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hal.structure.identifierSchool of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University, Wellington
dc.contributor.authorGemmell, Norman
hal.structure.identifierLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
dc.contributor.authorRatto, Marisa
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-01T14:10:07Z
dc.date.available2019-10-01T14:10:07Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/19951
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectTax evasionen
dc.subjectlate payment penaltiesen
dc.subjecttax experimenten
dc.subjectgoods and service taxen
dc.subject.ddc336en
dc.subject.classificationjelH.H2.H26en
dc.subject.classificationjelC.C9.C93en
dc.titleThe effects of penalty information on tax compliance: evidence from a New Zealand field experimenten
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherVictoria University of Wellington;New Zealand
dc.description.abstractenThe ‘standard’ Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion predicts effects oncompliance which depend on the perceived probability of detection, tax rate and penalty forevasion. Compliance effects of detection probabilities and tax rates have been extensively testedempirically, but penalty effects are rarely tested explicitly. This paper examines the effects of latepayment penalties on tax compliance based on an experiment involving New Zealand goods andservice tax (GST) ‘late payers’. Firstly, based on an ASY-type model of tax late payments in whichthe probability of enforcement, rather than detection, is central, we develop a number of testablehypotheses. Secondly, based on a field experiment involving a specific compliance intervention, weexamine how taxpayers respond when given different penalty information. The experiment alsoallows us to consider differences between taxpayers’ stated intentions to comply and subsequentlyobserved compliance. Results suggest that differences in penalty information given to taxpayersand reductions in penalty rates both affect taxpayers stated intentions to comply (pay overdue taxand penalties) as predicted. However, subsequently observed responses generally appearunresponsive to penalties. Nevertheless, various individual taxpayer characteristics are identifiablethat affect both compliance intentions and actual behaviour.en
dc.publisher.nameThe Working Papers in Public Financeen
dc.publisher.cityVictoriaen
dc.identifier.citationpages31en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleThe Working Papers in Public Financeen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber03/2017en
dc.contributor.countryeditoruniversityotherNEW ZEALAND
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie publiqueen
dc.identifier.citationdate2017
dc.description.ssrncandidatenonen
dc.description.halcandidateouien
dc.description.readershiprechercheen
dc.description.audienceInternationalen
dc.date.updated2019-09-24T14:28:35Z
hal.identifierhal-02302534*
hal.version1*
hal.update.actionupdateFiles*
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