Endogenous money and shareholders' funds in the classical theory of banking
de Boyer des Roches, Jérôme (1998), Endogenous money and shareholders' funds in the classical theory of banking, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 5, 1, p. 60-84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10427719800000003
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
1998Journal name
European Journal of the History of Economic ThoughtVolume
5Number
1Publisher
Routledge
Pages
60-84
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de Boyer des Roches, JérômeAbstract (EN)
By its nature, bank money is endogenous, but its issuing is risky and presupposes the presence of banks' shareholders' funds. Shareholders' funds give banks the means of dealing with the difficulties involved in the process of money creation and which are inherent to the banking activity: convertibility constraint, credit and liquidity risks. Unlike the Ricardian paradigm, Smith's 'real bill theory' and Thornton's 'lender of last resort theory' point out the functions of shareholder's funds. Therefore their monetarybanking approachs seem more complementary than contradictory. In other respects, the theory of endogenous money and credit introduces risks and capital in the analysis of exchange and lead to questioning the classical market theory constructed on the model of bartering.Subjects / Keywords
Classical school of economics; Money; Stock funds; Banks & bankingRelated items
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