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Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs

Renault, Jérôme; Ziliotto, Bruno (2020), Hidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs, Games and Economic Behavior, 124, p. 122-139. 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.001

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2020
Journal name
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
124
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
122-139
Publication identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.001
Metadata
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Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Ziliotto, Bruno
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision [CEREMADE]
Abstract (EN)
We introduce the model of hidden stochastic games, which are stochastic games where players observe past actions and public signals on the current state. The natural state variable for these games is the common belief over the current state of the stochastic game. In this setup, we present an example in which the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to 1, does not exist. Although the equilibrium payoff sets have full dimension, there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs. The example is symmetric and robust in many aspects, and in particular to extensive-form correlation or communication devices. No reasonable limit equilibrium payoff exists, and it is difficult to give any good answer to the question: “In the game played by extremely patient players, what are the possible outcomes?” The construction generalizes on a recent zero-sum example (Ziliotto, 2016), while improving significantly its properties.
Subjects / Keywords
Stochastic games; Limit equilibrium payoffs; Hidden states

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