Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion
Mathis, Jérôme (2008), Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion, Journal of Economic Theory, 143, 1, p. 571-584. 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2008Journal name
Journal of Economic TheoryVolume
143Number
1Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
571-584
Publication identifier
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Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Mathis, JérômeLaboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Abstract (EN)
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability.Subjects / Keywords
Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable typesRelated items
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