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Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Mathis, Jérôme (2008), Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion, Journal of Economic Theory, 143, 1, p. 571-584. 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Journal name
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
143
Number
1
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
571-584
Publication identifier
10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
Metadata
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Author(s)
Mathis, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine [LEDa]
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Abstract (EN)
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability.
Subjects / Keywords
Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable types
JEL
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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